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1. THE LEVELS OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND
PUBLIC FINANCE IN POSTWAR JAPAN
Postwar Economic Growth of Japan
The four key factors associated with the high economic growth rate
in Japan have been a high level of capital formation, investment
demand, and capital productivity coupled with the rapid absorp-
tion of disguised unemployment.
HIGH LEVEL OF CAPITAL FORMATION1
-
Oneof the most conspicuous factors contributing to the very high
growth rate of the postwar Japanese economy is the high propor-
tion of capital formation out of gross national product (GNP) or
gross domestic product (GDP). Table 1, which compares Japan's
post-war and prewar periods, indicates that both the postwar growth
Nom: The author is indebted to Shinji Imanaga, Takashi Ohmura, and
Minoru Monden, all of the Tax Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Finance, who
assisted him in preparing data underlying some of the tables in this paper, and
answered his questions with unwearied patience. He is also grateful for the
helpful comments of John A. Buttrick, Sei Fujita, and Ryuichiro Tachi. The
research underlying this paper was partly financed by a grant from the Fund
for Advancement of Economic Research, the University of Tokyo.
For conversion purposes, 1yen =0.28U.S. cents, or 360 yen = $1.
Unlike most other papers presented to the Conference, the analysis in this
paper is confined mostly to the effects of taxation on capital formation. Un-
doubtedly taxation affects the course of economic growth in other ways as well.
However, at least so far as postwar Japan is concerned, not much is known about
the effects of taxation on work incentives, on supply of venture capital, on
mergers and industrial organization, and so on. Also, in postwar Japan, the pro-
motion of capital formation, encouragement of export, and development of
heavy and chemical industries have been the three main pillars of economic
policy. The policy-makers have paid little attention to the resource-reallocation,
income-redistribution, or counter.cyclical functions of the tax system.40 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
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1.1887—96 10 4.2 11.0 6.4
2.1897—1906 JO 2.7 9.3 2.0
3.1907—16 10 4.9 11.9 7.3
4.1917—26 10 3.4 16.3 9.3
5.1927—36 10 4.8 15.9 9.7
6.1931—40 10 4.9 17.2 11.5
7.1950—55 6 9.0 26.7 22.4
8.1955—60 6 11.7 31.6 24.2
SOURCE: Kazushi Ohkawa, Analysis of the Japanese Economy; Growth and Structure (in
Japanese), Tokyo, 1962; Japanese Government's National IncomeWhite Paper
(annual); Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan: 1868—1940, New York, 1961.
aGrossdomestic capital formation divided by GNP, both in current prices.
b Net national capital formation divided by net national product, both in current
prices.
rate and capital formation ratios are about double their prewar lev-
els. Compared with the other industrial nations in this survey,
Japan's gross domestic saving and gross domestic investment ratios
were the highest (see Table 2). Moreover, starting from around 1955,
there has been a marked upward trend in Japan's capital forma-
tion ratio (see Table 3). The postwar reconstruction process in
various sectors of the economy ended around 1953 or 1954, and the
Japanese economy entered, after 1956, a new era of growth, led by a
heavy investment spurt. Between 1955 and 1961, the real gross fixed
investment within the private sector increased at the exceptionally
high rate .of 29.6 per cent per annum and its ratio to GNP jumped
from 9.4 to 24.2 per cent. In terms of saving, the average propensity
to save of both the household sector and wage- and salary-earners'
families doubled between 1954 and 1961. In 1961 the ratio of gross
domestic investment to GNP stood at an unprecedented high level
of 44.9 per cent, and the household sector's average propensity to
save out of disposable income stood at 21.3 per cent.2
2Theinvestment and savingratios declinedslightly in1962. This was due toJapan 41
TABLE2
InternationalComparison of Rate of Growth and
Capital Formation Proportions, 1950—60
(ratio of investment to GDP,a per cent)
Gross Ratio of Gross
Rate of GrossInvestmentIncreaseDomestic
Growth inDomesticin Plant and in Saving
Country Real GDPInvestmentEquipment"Stocks to GDP°
Japan 9.5 28.9 16.3 6.2 29.9
Germany,
Fed. Rep. 7.7 23.8 13.4 2.7 26.0
Italy 6.0 21.0 12.7 0.9 20.5
Netherlands 4.4 25.0 14.8 2.3 26.8
France 4.2 18.4 11.2 1.6 18.4
UnitedStates 3.3 17.6 10.0 1.1 18.3
Sweden 3.2 21.3 12.1 1.0 21.4
United
Kingdom 2.8 15.7 10.3 1.0 15.5
SouRcE: U.N., rearbook of National Accounts Statistics and World Economic Survey,
1959 and 1960.
In constant prices. Average for 1950—60.
bFixedcapital formation by private enterprises, public corporations and govern-
ment enterprises.
°Incurrent prices. Average for 1950—60.
STRONG INVESTMENT DEMAND
Investment demand has been high in postwar Japan. Why has
this been so?
1. Except possibly for some Eastern European countries, the
damage to the Japanese economy caused by World War II was the
heaviest, and the recovery and reconstruction period after the war
was the longest, experienced by any nation. Most production and
consumption statistics did not regain their prewar peaks until some-
time between 1950 and 1954. Industrial production passed its pre-
war high in 1951 and real per capita consumption recovered its pre-
war (1934-36) level in 1953. Therefore, Japan's very rapid rate of
economic growth and capital accumulation up until 1955 might be
the monetary tightening which followed the balance of payments difficulty in
1961, and to a rise in the income-share of hitherto low-income families.42 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE3
Japan'sInvestment and Saving Ratios,a 1950—61





Gross Private to Saveof Wage.
DomesticFixed Gross of theand Salary-
FiscalInvest- Invest-DomesticPersonalHouseholdEarner's
Yearmentb mentb Saving0Saving0 Sectord
1950 26.5 9.8 29.4 10.4 13.8 —
1951 28.7 9.7 30.6 13.2 19.1 2.0
1952 26.1 10.4 25.9 11.3 15.6 4.4
1953 26.3 10.5 23.8 7.4 10.6 5.6
1954 23.7 10.3 22.1 7.5 10.4 7.2
1955 25.3 9.4 25.3 10.1 13.9 8.9
1956 30.0 13.8 30.3 10.5 14.9 11.3
1957 30.4 15.9 30.9 10.8 15.3 11.9
1958 28.0 16.3 30.4 11.3 15.5 12.1
1959 36.1 17.8 34.9 12.4 18.3 13.4
1960 40.1 22.0 39.4 13.4 20,1 14.3
1961 44.9 24.2 41.3 13.8 21.3 15.9
SOURCES: Japanese Government, National Income White Paper and Annual Report on
Family Income and Expenditure Survey.
aRatioto GNP, unless otherwise specified.
b Annual average in constant (1955) prices.
In current prices.
d Personal saving divided by disposable income for calendar year.
explained as that of a recovery and reconstruction period, but the
accelerated growth and capital accumulation thereafter cannot be
considered part of the recovery process.8
2. Technological innovations which were introduced during and
after the war in the United States and other foreign countries were
introduced into Japan after the war. This rapidly narrowed the
'Untilafew years ago there were many writers in Japan who considered that
thecountry'srapid economic growth was primarily due to recovery factors, and
who predicted that the rate of growth would decline as recovery factors dis-
appeared. See for example Japanese Government, Economic White Paper (in
Japanese) for 1956 and 1958.Japan 43
gaps in technology between Japan and foreign countries, and at the
same time created in Japan vast new investment
3. The land reform, the dissolution of the Zaibatsu regime, the
diffusion of labor unionism, and other reform measures which were
carried out after the war resulted in a more equal distribution of
income than in prewar years and in the expansion of the domestic
market. Particularly, the land reform led to a rise in the living
standards of the peasants. The rapid spread of consumer durables
such as TV sets, sewing machines, and washing machines would
never have occurred under the prewar semifeudal system of land-
holding.
4. Dissolution of the Zaibatsu regime, rapid changes in the in-
dustrial structure, and the general increase in the size of the econo-
my encouraged the growth of enterprising new firms and made most
sectors of the economy more competitive than in prewar years. The
much talked-about "excessive competition" or "excessive invest-
ment" in various industries often has been nothing but an ordinary
form of competition in a growing industry. Generally, large firms in
major industries engage in vigorous competition with each other
through the rapid expansion of productive capacity, introduction of
new products and processes, opening up of new domestic and ex-
port: markets, modernization of management, and so on.
5. Finally, the expected and realized rapid increase in total effec-
tive demand induced a high level of investment.
HIGH CAPITAL PRODUCTIVITY
The productive efficiency of investment, as reflected in low capi-
tal-output ratios, tends to be higher in Japan than in the other
industrial countries (Table 4).
There are several reasons why Japan's capital-output ratio is low.
First, the level of effective demand relative to capacity has been on
In postwar Japan, all contracts to buy foreign patent rights and technical
know-how must be authorized by the government. The annual number of
foreign patent and know-how contracts authorized by he government followed
a pattern similar to the level of investment: a declining tendency from 1952
to 1955, and a spurt after 1956 and particularly after 1959. This power of the
government to authorize patent contracts and imports of foreign capital will be
one of the major tools of the government's selective control over industries
and individual companies after trade liberalization.44 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 4










Japan 3.1 1.7 0.65
Germany, Fed. Rep. 3. 1 1 .7 0.35
Italy 3.5 2.1 0.15
France 4.4 2.7 0.39
United States 5.4 3. 1 0.54
United Kingdom 5.6 3.7 0.36
Netherlands 5.7 3.4 0.53
Sweden 6.6 3.8 0.32
SouitcE: Table 2.
the average very high in prosperous postwar Japan. Thus, most in-
dustries have operated at a high level of capacity utilization. Sec-
ond, in countries like Japan where the war damage was severe, in-
dustrial production declined to a very low level. Thus, a given
amount of additional investment resulted in a relatively large in-
crease in output when additional capital was used to repair partly
damaged facilities and to convert the munitions industry to a
peacetime one.5 This was true not only of plant and equipment but
also of social overhead capital.
Third, the proportion of replacement to total gross investment is
lower for a country where the rate of growth in output is higher.
Therefore, there is some negative correlation between the rate of
growth and the incremental capital-output ratio for various coun-
tries and periods.6 Fourth, so far as the total gross domestic invest-
ment is concerned, heavy investment in social overhead capital and
residential construction tends to raise the incremental capital-out-
put ratio. In this regard, it is noted that residential construction in
Japan accounted for only 1.7 per cent. (1950-60 annual average) of
GDP, whereas in most other industrial countries it amounted to 4
Cf. Miyohei Shinohara, Growth and Cycles in the Japanese Economy (in
Japanese), Tokyo, 1961, Chapter II.
eAfact emphasized by Miyohei Shinohara, ibid., pp. 161 if.Japan 45
to 5 percent. Fifth, perhaps the most basic reason why the capital-
output ratio is so low in Japan lies in its supply of labor or factor
proportions.
Japan's low capital-output ratio is not merely a postwar phenom-
enon. Among some ten countries for which long-run data on growth
rates and capital formation ratios are available,T Japan's capital-
output ratio has generally been the lowest for a very long period.
ABSORPTION OF DISGUISED UNEMPLOYMENT
In Japan, although the level of clear-cut unemployment has been
very low throughout the postwar period, there have been various
forms of "disguised unemployment" in low-productivity sectors of
the economy such as agriculture, retail trade, and small-scale manu-
facturing. It is extremely difficult to derive a meaningful definition
of unemployment because of the existence of such disguised unem-
ployment. However, according to the government's Labor Force
Survey, the labor force actively engaged in agriculture, which ac-
counted for about 43 per cent of total employment (including self-
employed and family workers) in 1950, declined at a rate of 1.0 per
cent per year between 1950 and 1955 and by 3.8 per cent annually
between 1955 and 1961. Thus, agriculture's share in the active labor
force was reduced to about 29 per cent in 1962. Since the index of
agricultural output8 increased at a fairly steady rate of 3.9 per cent
per year between 1950 and 1961, disguised unemployment in agri-
culture was apparently being mobilized for more efficient produc.
tion in other sectors of the economy. Nonagricultural employment
in Japan increased at an annual rate of 6.4 per cent between 1950
and 1955, and at a rate of 3.4 per cent between 1955 and 1961. This
was much faster than in other industrial countries. That these are
remarkably high rates is shown by the fact that from 1900 to 1941
the five-year average annual rate of increase in nonagricultural em-
See Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Na-
tions, IV; Long-Term Trends in Capital Formation Proportions," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, No. 4, Part 2, July 1961, pp. 13-15.
The countries included are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Nor-
way, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
real terms. The index is published by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry.•.--. -- — —_--'_ ——V - — -—-.y -'.-. --. r ...rr
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ployment never surpassed 3 per cent at a time when Japan's total
population was increasing at at much higher rate than it now
Movement of labor from low- to high-productivity sectors, or, in
other words, the reduction of disguised unemployment, has been
taking place in other ways as well. In the last decade, and particu-
larly since 1959, the degree of labor mobility has been increasing.
The difference in wage rates between large- and small-scale estab-
lishments, which is very often mentioned as a peculiar characteristic
of the Japanese economy, widened considerably in postwar years
until 1959. Then the trend was definitely reversed, and in the past
three years, the wage differential has been narrowing very rapidly.
The Structure of Public Finance and
Government Capital Formation
Public finance in postwar Japan has several distinctive character-
istics compared with other countries in this study. Tables 5 and 6
provide selective comparison of tax structures and government
saving and investment ratios. These tables are based upon the United
Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, and give the
average ratio of each item to GDP for 1950 through 1960. The con-
cepts used here are similar to those in the Yearbook, except that in
these tables interest on public debt is included in government's cur-
rent expenditure rather than subtracted from current revenue as in
the Yearbook. The term government in these tables means the gen-
eral government comprising central and local governments and social
security funds, but does not cover government enterprises and public
corporations.
First, the aggregate level of public finance in postwar Japan is
very low as compared with other countries. In levels of government
current revenue, government current expenditures, or total govern-
ment expenditures (including both current and investment expen-
ditures), Japan is ranked below the countries listed in Table 5. Since
the Meiji period, the government has played a leading role in the
development of the Japanese economy, and its role has not dimin-
ished in postwar years. However, in terms of the aggregate level of
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TABLE 6
International Comparison of Components of Finance: Saving and Investrnenta
(per cent of GNP)








Germany, Fed.Rep. 6.7 2.7 18.9 10.0 4.3
Netherlands 6.1 3.4 18.9 12.7 3.2
France 3.0 2.0 9.4 6.8 1.2
Sweden 5.1° 3.2 16.1 11.2 1.9
United Kingdom 1.0 1.4 3.1 5.5 0.5
2.6 2.5 8.4 8.8 0.3
Canada 3.2 3.5 12.4 14.5 0.8
UnitedStates 2.1 2.3 8.0 9.2 2.5
Japan 6.4 4.8 29.8 24.9 0.6
Japan° 5.7 5.1 27.1 25.9
SouRcE: U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics andWorldEconomic Survey,
1959 and 1960: Japanese Government, National Income White Paper.
aAnnualaverage ratio for 1950—60, unless otherwise specified.
bAdjustedfor government's provisions for fixed capital consumption, where data
areavailable.
Includesprovisions for fixed capital consumption.
d1955—60,except cal. 2, which is 1950—60.
1955—60.
public finance, the relative weight of the government in the econo-
my is quite low in Japan compared with European standards. Since
the government takes less from the private sector in postwar Japan,
ceteris paribus, there is a larger amount of resources available for
capital formation within the private sector.'° This is particularly so
10Itmay 'be argued that the relative weight of the government in most ad-
vanced countries is also low. In fact, the ratio of government current revenue
to GDP (1950-60 annual average) for countries for which data are available
from the Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics is as follows (per cent): Bur-
ma 17.7, Chile 19.4, Taiwan 12.6, Colombia 14.0, Ecuador 19.4, Greece 20.8,
Philippines 10.5, Portugal 19.2. However, although Japan, in per capita na-Japan 49
in view of the Japanese tax structure, as discussed in the next sec-
tion.
In an economy where a lack of investment incentives is an obsta-
cle to economic growth, an increase in government expenditures
may promote capital formation in the private sector. But in post-
war Japan, a lack of investment opportunities has seldom been a
problem. Most interest rates have been kept artifically low by gov.
ernment intervention under the so-called "low interest rate policy,"
so that very often some form of allotment of funds is enforced. Yet,
the free-market interest rate is substantially higher than in other
advanced countries.11 Nevertheless, there has rarely been a lack of
investment demand. In such an economy, the available supply of
investment funds is a very important factor determining the level of
private capital formation, and a small share of government revenue
is conducive to private capital formation.
It has been possible to keep the level of government revenue rela-
tively low in Japan because the levels of defense, social security ex-
penditures, and interest on public debt have been low. In postwar
Japan, the development of a socialsecurity system has been
sacrificed in favor of low government expenditures and economic
growth. Also, postwar inflation (price level rose to three to four
hundred times the prewar level) and adherence to the principle of
the balanced budget by the central government have held govern-
ment interest payments at a low level.
The second conspicuous feature of postwar Japanese public
finance is the high level of government saving and investment, as
shown in Table 6. In spite of the low level of government revenue,
in the ratio of government net saving to GDP, Japan was surpassed
tional income evaluated at the official exchange rate, is not significantly differ-
ent from some of those countries, the general characteristics of the Japanese
economy are more akin to the countries listed in Table 5 and 6 (for example,
in birth rate, literacy, spread of higher education, the percentage of population
in agriculture, average life expectancy, availability of financial and savings in-
stitutions to small business and general public, patterns of income distribution
by size, industrial distribution of national income produced, and so forth).
11Forexample, the average yield on newly-issued first-class corporate bonds
with a maturity of five years ranged from 9.0 to 9.2 per cent between 1950 and
1954. From 1956 to 1961, similar bonds with a maturity of seven years were
issued, to yield from 7.6 to 7.9 per cent. See Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics
of Japan (annual).- -
- - ——
-
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only by Finland, Norway and West Germany, and in the ratio of
government saving to government revenue, only by Finland. In the
ratio of government fixed investment to GDP, Japan was the highest
of all countries, except New Zealand and Australia where invest-
ment expenditures of government enterprises and public corpora-
tions are not separated from those of general government.
Although the two main driving forces in the process of capital
formation in postwar Japan have been a brisk private investment in
plant and equipment and a high level of household saving, the rel-
atively small government sector has made a significant contribution
to capital formation by maintaining very high levels of public sav-
ing and investment.
II. PERSONAL SA VING AND THE TAX SYSTEM
The High Personal Saving Ratio
In postwar Japan, the ratio of personal savingl2 to disposable in-
come in the household sector has been very high. and, particularly
since 1955, has shown a marked upward trend (See Table 3 above).
Factors associated with this high level of personal saving include:13
(1) A high rate of growth of real income per capita. (2) A large
share of proprietors' income in the nonagricultural sector.14 (3) A
high and increasing proportion of "bonus"15 income in the income
of wage and salary earners. (4) Certain characteristics of the Japa-
nese life cycle of income-earning and spending.16 (5) Lack of de-
Personal saving in Japanese national income statistics is defined similarly
to the American concept, as disposable income of the household sector less
personal consumption expenditures. Therefore, it includes "net" savings of in-
dependent proprietors.
12Seemy, "Supply of Personal Savings," in Economic Growth of Postwar
Japan (in Japanese), ed. by R. Komiya, Tokyo, 1963, for detailed discussion.
The average saving ratio for peasant families has been lower than that for
urban wage- and salary-earners' families since 1953.
The"bonus" is paid by larger corporations and by the government to all
of their regular employees at the end of the year or accounting period, and
amounts to two, three or even six months' salaries depending upon the profits
earned.
For example,theso-called"salary-schedule-according-to-age," saving for
dowry by young female workers, or the custom of leaving property to posterity.,-.-Y-, —
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velopment, until recently, of systems of consumer finance and of
home mortgage finance, which has resulted in consumers saving first
and accumulating liquid assets before buying consumer durables or
even houses.
On the other hand, the high personal saving ratio cannot be at-
tributed to an unequal size distribution of income, or to a "low
wage rate," -or a small share of labor income in total personal in-
come. Despite conceptual difficulties in international income com-
parisons, existing comparisons of the size distribution of income
suggest that the Japanese income distribution is about as unequal
as that in the U.S. and definitely less unequal than that in Germany
or Holland.17 Furthermore, the share of pure property income of
households in total personal income is much smaller for Japan than
for Belgium, the United States, Britain, Canada, or Australia. -
Declineof the Personal Income Tax
Relative to Indirect Taxes
Table 5 shows that Japan's ratio of direct taxes on households to
GDP is very low. For the period 1955-60, direct taxes on households
amounted to only 6.1 per cent of GDP, lower than for any other
country in the table. Moreover, Japan has one of the lowest ratios
of personal direct taxes to total government revenue among ad-
vanced countries. -
Accordingto the U.N. definition, direct taxes on households in-
clude not only the personal income tax, death duty and other direct
taxes on individuals, but also contributions to social security funds
by employees and employers. Thus, not all components of direct
taxes on households are progressive. Generally, however, the tax
structure as a whole is less progressive in countries where direct taxes
on households constitute a relatively smaller, and indirect taxes a
larger, share of the total tax revenue.18 In postwar Japan, the per-
sonal income tax share has not only been low but was shrinking
See ibid., I. B. Kravis, "International Differences in the Distribution of In-
come," Revue of Economics and Statistics, November 1960; and H. Oshima, "The
International Comparison of Size Distribution of Family Incomes with Special
Reference to Asia," ibid., November 1962.
This argument ignores the relative importance of the corporate income





























—4 are computed from Economic Planning Bureau, National
Cots. 5—7 are based upon Ministry of Finance, Public Finance
data prepared by Ministry of Finance.
Figures for 1962 and 1963 are budget figures; others are settlement figures.
prior to 1959, as indicated in Table 7•19Becauseof the very high rate
of economic growth, the government has reduced tax rates almost
Although there are minor national and local taxes on individuals and cor-
portions other than income tax, more than 90 per cent of the figure for per-
sonal and nontax payments in national income statistics is represented by na-
tional and local income taxes, and, except for the surplus of the government
PersonalSocial rate National Taxesa
Fiscal
Year



































































YearIncome TaxIncome Tax Taxes Local Taxes
1.950135.8(48.7)24.4(39.8)60.5( 20.7)— —
195160.5 (26.8)4.5(5.4)51.0( 19.8)— —
1952112.7(49.9)—19.1(—l0.4)— 6.5(—2.2)27.7( 10.2)
195377.3(28.6)15.5(8.3)33.2(9.0)18.0(5.8)
1954 31.4(10.7) 2.6( 1.3)—20.0(—4.6)26.3(78)
1955 53.3(18.7)12.0(6.0) 0.8(0.2) 6.6(1.8)
195622.6( 8.1)—14.4(— 7.5)— 6.7(—1.5)—12.3(—3.2)
1957110.2(36.1)—21;9(— 8.4)—26..6(—5.2)12.3(2.7)
1958 6.3( 2.5)21.5(5.9) 6.3(1.1)20.0(3.8)
1959 23.l( 9.4) 3.8(1.1)—17.4(—2.8) 8.4(1.5)
1960 0( 0) 0( 0)— 6.6(—1.0)11.8(2.2)
1961 56.3(14.4) 39.9( 7.0)—21.8(—2.6)12.8(1.7)
1962 50.3(10.1) 1.3( 0.2)62.4(6.2)39.9(4.4)
196366.8(11.7)—12.8(1.7)— 4.2(—0.4) 18.8 (2.0)
SOURCE: Computed from Ministry of Finance data.
Figures in parentheses give the ratio of tax to the previous year's
revenue of each item in per cent.
every year. Since the income elasticity of most taxes is substantially
greater than one; and only for a very few is it less than one, if tax
rates had not been cut, tax revenue would have increased at a much
faster rate than national income. Thus, the annual changes in the tax
laws constitute an important part of the government's budgetary
policy every year and are called the "tax-cut policy" in Japanese.
Table 8 shows the amount of tax reduction for a "normal year"
brought about by each year's change in tax laws since 1950. The
table shows, for example, that the changes in personal income tax
laws in 1950 reduced the personal income tax revenue for the "nor-
mal year" by 135.8 billion yen; this was 48.7 per cent of the person-
owned Bank of Japan, practically all of the corporate profits tax and nontax
payments is made up of national and local corporate income taxes.54 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
al income tax proceeds in 1949. Table 8 indicates not only that
there have been very substantial cuts in personal income taxes al-
most every year since 1950, but also that a very high proportion of
total tax reduction has been represented by reduction in personal
income taxes. During the period between 1950 and 1963, the basic
exemption was raised from 25,000 to 110,000 yen and the exemp-
tion for the first dependent (spouse) was raised from 12,000 to
105,000 yen. The increase in the basic exemption was somewhat
greater than the increase in per capita national income. Tax rates
at higher income levels have also been reduced: for example, the
marginal rate at B00,000 yen, which was 55 per cent in 1950, is now
15 per cent.2°
On the other hand, the proportion of corporate income tax to
total tax revenue has been rising during this period as the share of
corporate income in national income has increased from 9.9 to 16.4
per cent, with no major changes in the corporate income tax laws.
The proportion of indirect taxes to total tax revenues remained at
almost the same level from 1950 to 1961. Income elasticity is only
slightly higher than unity for most indirect taxes.
Indirect taxes are generally regressive: that is, lower income fam-
iliës pay more indirect taxes in. proportion to their income than
higher income families. Japanese indirect taxes are no exception in
this regard. Table 9 gives the per cent of total indirect tax revenues
derived from each of the major indirect taxes.
A large proportion of indirect tax revenue comes from taxes on
liquor, tobacco, sugar, electricity and gas, and admissions. These
taxes are undoubtedly regressive.21 Also, a substantial part of some
Marginal rates of national personal income tax in 1963 start at 8 per cent
for annual taxable income less than 100,000 yen and go up to 75 per cent for
income over 60 million yen. Local personal income tax rates for the highest
bracket are between 10 and 15 per cent depending on locality, so that when
national and local taxes are taken together, the rate goes up to 90 per cent of
the taxable income. This does not necessarily mean that such a high rate of tax
is actually borne.
to Ministry of Finance estimates, on the assumption that these
taxes are shifted to consumers, the average ratio of indirect tax bUrdens to
family income is5.2 per cent for families subject to national income tax,
whereas itis 8.4 per cent for lower income families paying no income tax.
This regressive tendency is observed even in excise taxes which are generally
considered as taxes on luxuries. See Commission for Tax Policy Investigation,
Supplementary Materials to the Report (in Japanese), Dec. 1961, p. 93.- -----—,.------—- - --- -- --- - -
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TABLE 9
Composition of Indirect Tax Revenues,
Tax National or LocalPercentage
Liquor tax National 21 .9
Taxes on tobacco and other government
monopoly goods" National and local 18.7
Real estate tax Local 15.8
Gasoline tax National 9.5
Customs duty National 7.8
Excise tax National 6.0
Sugar tax National 4.4
Revenue stamp National 4.1
Electricity and gas tax Local 3.2
Amusement and restaurant tax Local 2.3
Automobile tax Local 1 .3
All others 5.0
Total 100.0
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance data.
Figures give the average ratio of each item to the total revenue of national and
local indirect taxes.
b Includes profits of the Government Monopoly Corporation and local taxes on
tobacco.
indirect taxes, such as the local and national automobile taxes, the
amusement and restaurant tax, or the liquor tax on higher quality
liquor, very likely are shifted to consumers through price increases
by companies using automobilesor restaurantsforbusiness
purposes.22 Assuming that at least part of the corporate income tax
is shifted to the general public, these facts indicate that the Japa-
nese tax structure has become considerably less progressive since
1950. This tendency has been reinforced by the favorable treatment
of property income explained below.
If the marginal propensity to save is greater for higher income
brackets, the decline in progressivity of the tax system, though
difficult to measure precisely,23 may be considered one factor con-
tributing to the postwar rise in the personal saving ratio.
"ExpenSe-account" consumption is practiced on a much larger scale in Japan
than in the United States.
"Onthe other hand, the popular argument that taxation of income reduces56 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
Special Tax Provisions to Promote Personal Saving.
Under the policy slogan of "reinforcement of personal saving,"
the government has introduced several special tax provisions to
favor various types of property income. In a country like postwar
Japan, where investment incentives are strong and the rate of inter-
est is quite high, the rate of capital formation is largely determined
by the supply of savings at the full employment (or full capacity)
level of GNP. Thus, the "reinforcement of personal saving" is
considered one of the most important objectives of Japanese tax
policy. The major tax provisions of the personal income tax to pro-
mote saving include the following.
1. Tax exemption of interest income from small deposits. When
the principal of a deposit, postal saving, other saving account, or a
bond is under a specified upper limit, the interest income is ex-
empted from personal income tax. The limit has been increased
four times since 1950; it was 500,000 yen in 1963. By depositing sav-
ings in many small accounts, one may evade taxes on interest in-
come altogether. This form of evasion was unchecked until 1963,
when banks and other financial institutions were required to report
the names of depositors to the tax office. Within a few months, the
number of all deposit accounts for which this provision applies fell
to about one-third the previous number.
2. Separate low taxation of interest income. Between 1955 and
1957, interest income was wholly tax exempt. Since 1957, interest
income has been taxed separately from other personal income at a
low withholding tax rate. Until 1963, the rate was 10 per cent; since
then, it has been only 5 per cent. Thus, interest income has not
been subject to progressive taxation. Since personal savings in small
accounts were already tax exempt, the low withholding rate has ap-
saving while taxation of consumption is favorable to saving is largely wrong,
since the argument ignores the fact that taxation of consumption reduces the
purchasing power of savings for future consumption or even inheritance.
The argument is correct, apart from the income redistributive effect discussed
in the text, only to the extent that saving is increased by the change in the
effective interest rate, or in other words, that the interest elasticity of saving
is greater than zero.Japan 57
pliedto only a small fraction (21.7 per cent in 1960) of total person-
al deposits and saving accounts.
3. Favorable treatment of dividend income. First, the withhold-
ing tax rate for dividends was temporarily lowered from the normal
rate of 20 per cent to 10 per cent in 1955, and then to 5 per cent in
1963. These low withholding rates on dividends have resulted in a
loss of personal income tax revenue, since only dividend payments
over a certain minimum must be reported to the tax office having
jurisdiction over the shareholder involved. Thus, the effect has been
almost the same as the tax exemption of interest on small deposits.
Secondly, the taxpayer can deduct 20 per cent (10 per cent if his
total income is more than 10 million yen) of dividend income from
his total income. This provision is also related to the basic question
of how to deal with the problem of double taxation of corporate
profit and personal dividend income. However, so far as its immedi-
ate effects are concerned, this measure represents a typical example
of the erosion of progressive taxation by special tax provisions,
since investments in stocks are more concentrated in higher income
classes than deposits and saving accounts,24 and since the fiat deduc-
tion rate of 10 per cent is advantageous to very high income classes.
This is particularly true if a part of corporate income tax is shifted
to the general public.
4. Exemption of capital gains on securities. Security gains are tax
exempt unless they are earned regularly, by cornering stocks or by
selling a business.25
See, for example, the following table:
The Balance of
Income Deposits and The Value of
Distribution Number of Saving Accounts Stocks Held
Quintile Households Per Household Per Household
First 967 65,712 12,376
Second 968 100,440 21,248
Third 967 117,485 41,523
Fourth 968 205,324 96,980
Fifth 967 462,981 419,335
Source:Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Survey of Trends in Saving
for 1960 and 1961, pp. 127—128.
In the Japanese tax system, other capital gains are not altogether exempt
I roni personal income tax. Approximately half of capital gainis added to
taxable income.1' - —
58 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic, Growth
5. Deduction of life insurance premiums. Life insurance premi-
ums up to a certain amount are deductible from income. The
amount was 2,000 yen in 1951, and has been raised eight times since
then. The amount deductible is now the first 15,000 yen plus half of
the next 35,000 yen. This provision does not reduce the progressivity
of the income tax as much as other concessions to property income,
so long as the upper limit to the deduction is reasonably set. Whether
the limit for this deduction is reasonable is a problem similar to
that of the basic exemption.
The budgetary estimates for revenue losses under each of these
provisions are given in Table 10. The amounts shown relate only to
the national personal income tax and do not include revenue losses
of local personal income taxes which automatically result from rev-
enue losses of the national personal income tax. It can be seen that
the revenue losses amount to no less than 15 per cent of total per-
sonal income tax revenue in 1958, 1959, and 1963. The rise in the
revenue losses after 1958 is attributable primarily to rapid increases
in personal saving brought about by the rapid economic growth
rate and a rise in the saving ratio. Particularly as regards provisions
(1) and (2), there has been no extension of coverage since 1958,26 so
the rise in revenue losses since then has been due to a rapid increase
in the balances of deposits and saving accounts. For example, in the
total deposit balances of individ4als with all ordinary commerical
banks, the proportion of time deposits accounted for 41.0 per cent
in 1950 and 72.6 per cent in 1962. This rise of time deposit balances
relative to demand deposits (including "ordinary deposits") may be
taken as an indication of the increase in the balance of personal sai'-
ings relative to the level of income.27
Effects of Special Tax Provisions on Personal Savings
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the effects of these special tax
provisions on personal savings. It is almost impossible to measure
Except the reduction in the tax rate in 1963 from 10 per cent to 5 per cent
on deposits to which 2. is applicable.
MAccording to a rough estimate, the share of deposits and saving accounts
inannualpersonal saving was around 50 per cent between 1954 and 1957, and
declined steadily thereafter to about 30 per cent in 1961. This is primarily due
to a rapid expansion of capital market and an increase in personal investment








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.60 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
the effect of a tax measure on personal saving by econometric re-
search since the number of observations is too small to eliminate
the influences of other factors. In a survey of ten macroeconometric
models of the postwar Japanese economy, one finds that the fitfor
investment functions is very unsatisfactory, but an aggregate con-
sumption function fits very well whatever explanatory variable is
used: disposable income, national income, consumption expendi-
ture in the last. period, or the previous highest consumption expen-
diture. It does not make much difference statistically which aggre-
gate is taken as the explanatory variable, and the addition of any
second explanatory variable leads to a spurious increase in the cor-
relation coefficient.28
Although it is almost impossible to measure econometrically the
effects of special tax provisions on personal saving, for the purpose
of evaluation, let us distinguish three aspects of special tax provi-
sions which favor property incomes in order to promote personal
saving.
THE INTEREST ELASTICITY OF SAVING
The basic theory implicit in these special tax provisions is that the
elasticity of the supply of personal saving is substantially greater
than zero. The theory is dubious both on theoretical and empiri-
cal grounds. Theoretically, even if a saver is rational and sensitive
to the change in the interest rate when deciding to save or spend, it
does not necessarily mean that he saves more when the rate of inter-
est is higher. For example, if he saves for future living expenses
(hump-saving) or to buy some consumer durable in the future, he
might well save less when the interest rate is higher and the princi-
pal grows faster. Therefore, there is no a priori ground to assume
that interest elasticity of personal saving is substantially greater
than zero.
Empirically, the average Japanese saver does not seem to be sensi-
tive to small changes in the interest rate. If he were rational with
respect to the relation between the interest rate and saving, he
should take into account, not only special tax provisions on saving,
but also the change in the consumer price index. However, a sharp
Tadao Uchida, "A Survey of Macroecononietric Model Analysis of the
Japanese Economy," in The Japanese Economy: Prewar and Postwar (in Japan-
ese), Ed. by Kazuo Okochi et aL,Tokyo1963.Japan 61
increase in the consumer price index in Japan since 1959 does not
seem to have affected the level of personal saving thus
Until recently, the personal savings ratio had been rising steadily
sinc 1958, in spite of t.he rise in prices. It would appear that the
ave:rage Japanese consumer determines his personal saving as a sort
of residual, after all "necessary" consumption expenditures have
been made, and that he does not pay much attention to the rate of
interest or the tax treatment of future interest income when making
his savings decisions.
This is not to deny the fact that the rate of interest may have a
considerable influence on consumers' decisions about the form in
which to hold assets. For example, the separate taxation of interest
income may have increased the relative share of deposits and saving
accounts in the total assets held by households. This is perhaps the
main reason why banks press for separate taxation of interest in-
come, security companies for favorable tax treatments of dividends,
and insurance companies for tax deduction of life insurance premi-
ums. Still, the average Japanese saver does not appear to be sensi-
tive to minor changes in the rates of returns effected by special tax
provisions. Wealthy businessmen, when questioned about their in-
come taxes, have shown that they are well informed about the taxes
on their salaries and bonuses, but frequently do not know much
about the special tax provisions applicable to their saving.
In the political climate of postwar Japan, the government cannot
favor any one of these pressure groups exclusively, so that the
effects, if any, on the composition of savings funds of various special
tax provisions to promote saving seem largely to cancel Out.
THE INCOME REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT
Property income is concentrated in the higher income brackets,
although it is perhaps less so in Japan than in the United States or
Great Britain since the average propensity to save out of disposable
income is considerably higher than zero even for low income fami-
In Japan the consumer price index was fairly stable between 1954 and
1959, but has risen rapidly since then.
Consumer Price Index (1960=100)
1958 95.5 1961 105.3
1959 96.5 1962 112.5
1960 100.0 1963 122.5.,
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lies. To the extent that higher income families receive a higher pro-
portion of their income from property holding, favorable treatment
of property income makes income distribution more unequal. If it
is assumed that the marginal propensity to save is higher for higher
income favorable tax treatment of property income
would have a positive effect on the total supply of personal saving.
THE TAX EVASION EFFECT
Two provisions to promote personal saving, namely, the exemp-
tion of interest income from small deposit accounts, and the sepa-
rate taxation of interest income, have given rise to increased per-
sonal income tax evasion. When a person who has earned a large
income buys stocks or real estate, his name and earnings are report-
ed to a tax office, and there is a possibility that he will be ques-
tioned about the source of these funds if the income reported in his
annual tax return is disproportionately low. However, when he de-
posits money with a bank, the latter institution is not required to
notify the tax office of the deposit, first, because most deposits are
exempt as small amount deposits, and secondly, because those de-
posits, which are not exempt are subject to separate taxation. Thus,
these two provisions make it possible for taxpayers to hide from the
eyes of tax officials certain types of income, such as proprietors
profits, capital gains, or professional income, for which the margin-
al propensity to save is probably much higher than the average.
This is perhaps one of the reasons why personal deposits and sav-
ings with banks and other financial institutions account for a large
proportion of personal saving in Japan.
possibilityis higher marginal propensity to save on the part of
property-income recipients than wage- or salary-earners of the same income size,
or higher marginal propensity to save out of property income than wages or
salaries even when received by the same person. In this connection, it may be
mentioned that tax burdens of independent proprietors and owners of small
corporations are relatively light, in comparison with, other income groups, such
as wage- or salary-earners and property income recipients who are subjected to
withholding taxation, because of administrative difficulties in assessing the in-
come and expenses of those income groups. Although there are other factors
which lower or raise the tax burden of each income group, it is generally be-
lieved that the above administrative factor outweighs others. If this is the case,
it is conducive to a high rate of saving, since the average, and hence perhaps
also marginal, propensity to save of the owners of small business is much
higher than that of others.I
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Conclusion
It is difficult to verify positive or negative influences of the spe-
cial tax provisions introduced to "reinforce personal saving." As of
now, there is no convincing empirical evidence that they have in-
creased personal saving. It seems, however, that if these provisions
tend to increase personal saving, it is only through their adverse re-
distributive effects,31 and not through an increase in the saving ratio
out of the income of the same size. In other words, personal saving
could have been increased only at a cost to equity. If an increase in
personal saving were sought, an over-all moderation .of the progres-
sive structure of personal income taxation would have been a less
inequitable solution. A still better solution might have been to in-
crease government saving by raising taxes rather than by trying to
increase the supply of personal saving.32
ii!. SPECiAL TAX PROViSIONS AND CORPORATE
SAVING AND IN VESTMENT
Special Tax Provisions
A peculiar characteristic of the national tax system in postwar
Japan is the enormous number of what are called "special tax pro-
visions" under which taxes are reduced selectively. There are be-
8.1.Exceptpossibly for the deduction of insurance premiums. See above.
Strange as it may seem to American economists, there is almost no discus-
sion of the effects of personal income taxation or favorable treatment of prop-
erty income on the incentive to undertake risks in Japan. This is in sharp con-
trast to a heated discussion of the effects of taxation on personal saving, and per-
haps suggests that such effects on incentives are not important in Japan, although
there is a need to examine them carefully. An overwhelming majority of large
companies in Japan are managed by salaried executives who have been em-
ployed in the same companies for twenty to thirty years after graduation from
a university. Generally, shareholders other than institutional investors have
little influence over company management. In such a situation, entrepreneur-
ship would be relatively little affected by taxation. The effects on incentive are
perhaps more important for smaller, closely held corporations, but they are not
influential politically. Also, in recent years no necessity has been felt to encour-
age risk taking, since there are so many aggressive and enterprising firms, both
small and large.64 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
tween 50 and 100 of these provisions, depending upon how we clas-
sify Each of these provisions was introduced in order to
achieve certain specific policy objectives, and is concerned with a
particular type of income, asset, or transaction, or with a particular
industry. In a rather extreme case, for example, the Special Tax
Provisions Act stipulates, in Article 66-9, that manufacturers of sul-
phate ammonium may deduct from their income a certain pre-
scribed part of the balance of their credit sale accounts receivable
from Japan Sulphate Ammonium Exporting Company (a semigov-
ernmental trading agency).
Most of these special tax provisions are subject to certain time
limits. However, these time limits are themselves openly debated in
connection with the government's annual budgetary and tax pol-
icies, since most are related to narrow policy objectives subject to
change. Every year, as a real or ostensible need to achieve a certain
objective arises or disappears, new provisions are introduced, old
ones abolished, or the coverages and tax rates are changed.
For the purpose of analysis here, the major provisions effective in
1963 may be classified as follows:
1. Provisions to reinforce personal saving. These provisions have
been dealt with in the previous section.
2. Provisions for tax-free reserves. Certain types of reserves are
made tax exempt up to certain prescribed limits in order to in-
crease the supply of internal funds .of corporations and proprietors.
There are separate but similar provisions dealing with reserves in
the personal and corporate income tax laws.
3. Provisions for accelerated depreciation allowances. To encour-
age investment in certain fields, depreciation allowances at much
higher rates than usual are permitted selectively on certain types of
fixed a.ssets, in certain industries, or for certain purposes. For each
provision in this category there are detailed specifications as to the
All of these provisions reduce rather than increase taxes selectively. The
provision limiting expense accounts of corporations is usually counted as one
which increases tax revenue, but it should be considered instead as providing
a standard for the assessment of income. These provisions are concerned with
national taxes. There are very few special tax provisions in local tax laws. How-
ever, since the tax bases of local personal and corporate income taxes are almost
the same as national taxes, revenue losses in national taxes brought about by spe-
cial tax provisions also affect local revenues.Japan 65
type of fixed assets, the name of the industry, the time period con-
cerned, and the rate at which the asset involved may be depreciated.
4. Provisions to promote introduction of new products and tech-
nologies. In addition to the use of accelerated depreciation to pro-
mote some innovations, other special tax provisions encourage in-
troduction of new products and technologies. One major one is the
exemption from personal or corporate income taxation, under cer-
tain conditions, of income from the sales of "important new prod-
ucts" designated by the Minister of Finance. The products so des-
ignated have been those whose production and sale involved great
risks, either because of technological inexperience or because of the
difficulty of predicting demand. (It was feared that some socially de-
sirable new products would not be introduced unless they were
given preferential tax treatment.) A second (since 1952) is the taxa-
tion at lower than normal rates of royalties on patents and tech-
nical know-how which are used in industries specified by the
Minister of Finance. A third (since 1951) allows the duty-free im-
portation of certain types of machinery and equipment used in in-
dustries designated by the Ministry of Finance.
5. Provisions to encourage export. A certain part of income from
export has been exempt from corporate or personal income tax
since 1953. This provision will be abolished in the near future,
since it is becoming more difficult to continue this form of subsidi-
zation of export industries in view of GATT provisions. Since 1961,
an accelerated depreciation privilege is granted corporations and
proprietors who raise the proportion of income from export in
their total income over the previous year's level. In the past there
were a few other minor provisions to encourage export, such as a
reserve for losses arising out of cancellations and claims in export
contracts (1953-60), and accelerated depreciation on assets used in
overseas branch offices (1953-60).
The estimates by the budget authorities of revenue losses result-
ing from provisions grouped under (2) through (5) are given in
Table 11. As shown in this table, most of these special provisions
were introduced around 1952 and 1953. When the Japanese tax sys-
tem was reformed in 1950, after the Shoup Report,84 there were no











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































168 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth.
special provisions except for "important new products" (which orig-
inated in 1914) and. the bad debt reserve and special repairs reserve
which were recommended by the Shoup Mission. Coverages of these
provisions tended to be extended, the rates reduced, and new provi-
sions introduced until around 1955. Line 21 of Table 11 gives the
ratio of total revenue losses due to these provisions to total revenue
from personal and corporate income taxes. The ratio reached a
peak of 21.8 per cent in 1955. Since then, although there have been
changes in the coverage in both directions, the curtailments of cov-
erage seem to have outweighed the extensions, and revenue losses
have increased less rapidly than the total tax revenue.
Of these four groups of special provisions, (2) and (3) will be
dealt with in the remaining parts of the paper. Here a few remarks
will be made on (4) and (5).
Theoretically, special provisions for new products and technol-
ogies, particularly tax exemption granted on "important new prod-
ucts" (as well as accelerated depreciation for machinery and equip.
ment used in research and development) have much to recommend
themselves from the standpoint of the "infant-industry" argument
for protection. The choice of the period during which corporate or
personal income is exempt from tax under the provision for "im-
portant new products" is about four years after the fixed assets used
in the production of such products are acquired by the corporation
or individual. This time period seems reasonable. The revenue loss
due to this provision is relatively small since the product in ques-
tion is rather narrowly defined, but the provision has played a cru-
cial role in the introduction of certain new products.
However, since this provision is selective in its application, there
remains the question of its administration: whether the choice of
"important new products"35 and of the period of exemption for
each product can be made well enough to justify these selective tax
treatments. Also, before 1957 there was no upper limit to the
amount of income exempt from the tax, and there were cases in
Before the revision in 1957, a few products which are not new, such as metal
ores, coal or lignite, were included. Among really "new" products, the applica-
tion of the provisionis concentrated in particular fields, such as synthetic
fibers, synthetic rubber, chemical fertilizers, pulp, petrochemical products, anti-
biotics, or rare metals.Japan 69
which very large quasi-monopoly incomes were exempted. Since
1957, tax exemption has been granted only until the cumulated in-
come from the sales of such products arriounts to 40 per cent of the
acquisition cost of fixed assets used in the production of such prod-
ucts.
Tax exemption of export income has an effect somewhat similar
to that of exchange depreciation.36 If there is any need to promote
exports by policy measures working through the price effect, it
would be better to depreciate the exchange rate rather than to in-
troduce special tax provisions. The latter complicates the tax system
unnecessarily and distorts the price structure because of its discrimi-
natory nature.
Tax-Free Reserves and Corporate Saving
Although many provisions of the tax system have important
effects on corporate saving and investment policies, two special fea-
tures .of the national tax system in postwar Japan will be dealt with
in this section: provisions for tax-free reserves and accelerated dc.
preciation allowances.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVISIONS FOR TAX-FREE RESERVES
There are seven types of transfers to reserves which are deducti-
ble from corporate income under the Japanese tax laws:
1. Reserves for bad debts (since 1950)
2. Reserves for inventory price fluctuations (since 1951)
3. Reserves for retirement allowances (since 1952)
4. Reserves for special repairs (since 1950)
5. Reserves for water shortage (since 1952)
6. Reserves for abnormal risks (since 1953)
7. Reserves for default losses (since 1952)
Of these seven types of reserves, the first three are relevent to
most industries, while the last three are applicable to only one in-
dustry each: hydroelectric generation, accident insurance, and com-
modity and stock exchanges, respectively. The reserve for special
The special low withholding tax rate for foreign patent and technological
royalties has a similar effect.r
70 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
repairs may be accumulated for major repairs on ships, blast fur-
naces, and a few -other items, and is relevant primarily to marine
transportation, the iron and steel, and the glass industries. Reserves
of types (1), (2), (3), and (4) are also deductible from personal in-
come, although the provisions applicable to individual proprietors
are somewhat different from those applicable to corporations.
Table 11 shows that in most years transfers to the first three
types of reserves accounted for more than 90 per cent of all revenue
losses due to special provisions for tax-free reserves. Table 12 gives
rough estimates of the ratio-s of accumulated reserves to owned capital
for each of these categories. The figures for owned capital used in
these computations were taken from balance sheets of corporations
and do not include tax-free reserves. The ratios for industrial corpo-
rations rose sharply from 1953 to 1956, but since then have leveled off
at about 10 per cent of owned capital. Since 1955, the tax-free re-
serves of financial corporations have amounted to more than 50 per
cent of owned capital.
THE LEVEL OF CORPORATE SAVING AND TAX-FREE RESERVES
In the usual presentation of balance sheets, tax-free reserves are
not shown as a part of owned capital, but in their actual functions a
large part of these reserves should be considered as part of owned
For this reason, in Japanese national income statistics, in-
creases in tax-free reserve balances are treated as a part of corporate
profits and saving.
Column 2 of Table 13 shows corporate saving as a percentage of
GNP from 1950 to 1961, and columns 3 through 6 give the percent-
ages of corporate saving accounted for by increases in various types
of tax-free reserves. After 1950, when the provision for a bad debt
reserve was first introduced into the Japanese tax system, new pro-
visions were added, coverages expanded, and the maximum limits
STUndoubtedly,not all of the reserves are to be so considered. For instance,
itis required to hold one-fourth of the reserve for retirement allowances in
liquid form. A certain part of each type of reserve should be similarly treated,
to meet the necessary payments from the reserve. However, when the total amount
transferred to the reserve in each accounting period is far greater than the
amount paid out, the increase in the balance of the reserve is very similar to
undistributed profit. The ways these tax-free reserves and transfers thereto are
treated in financial statements differ somewhat from one• corporation to another.Japan 71
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SouRcE: Computed from Ministry of Finance, Annual Report of Corporation Statistics;
National Federation of Commercial Banks Association, Analysis of Financial Statement
of All Commercial Ban/cs; National Association of Mutual Banks, Analysis of Finanrial
Statements of All Mutual Banks; National Federation of Credit Associations, A Survey of
All Credit Associations; Ministry of Finance, Insurance Yearbook; and other Ministry of
Finance data.
aThebalances of reserves are computed by deducting the balances of financial
corporations (included in 2 above) and of securities dealers from the total balances
of reserves given in the Ministry of Finance data. Therefore, they are overestimated
by the amount of reserves held by such financial corporations as credit cooperative
associations (shinyo-kumiai), labor credit associations (rodo-kinko), and a few others
which are not included in 2.
bCommercialbanks, long-term credit banks, mutual banks, credit associations
(shinyo-kinko), and life and accident insurace companies.
raised, until 1955 (see Table 12). During this period, the accumula-
tion of these reserves accounted for a very large proportion of total
corporate saving—almost 50 per cent in the recession year 1954. In
1956, the tax laws began to restrict the accumulation of these re-
serves and, since then, the proportion of corporate saving accounted
for by the increases in these reserves has declined fairly rapidly.72 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 13
Ratios of Direct Taxes on Corporations and Corporate Saving to GNP,
and Increases in Tax-Free Reserves, 1950—61
(per cent)
R Percentage of Corporate Saving Accounted
for by Increases in Tax-Free Reserves
Direct Total
Taxes InventoryRetire-(Including
on CorporateBad Price ment Other
Corpora-Saving Debt Fluctua-AllowanceTypes of
Yeartions tions Reserves)
(1) (2). (3) (4) (5) (6)
19502.8 4.9 5.8 0 0 5.8
19513.8 5.4 3.8 0 0.1 4.2
19523.9 2.7 7.4 3.8 21.3 35.3
1953 3.2 4.4 6.7 9.6 12.2 34.0
19543.5 2.7 11.3 16.6 16.0 47.5
19552.8 3.1 6.3 12.7 15.8 38.0
1956 3.1 5.1 4.6 8.2 7.1 23.6
19574.0 5.0 9.1 7.0 2.7 22.3
19584.0 2.9 13.2 1.8 10.4 27.7
1959 3.7 5.4 5.7 2.5 4.4 15.1
19604.4 7.0 2.8 2.9 7.1 12.1
1961 4.8 6.8 5.3 4.1 7.1 16.5
SOURCE:National Income White Paper and Ministry of Finance data.
Another reason for the higher percentages for 1952-55 than for later
years is that in the earlier years the maximum limits on the accu-
mulated balances of the bad debt and retirement allowance reserves
had been reached by few corporations, whereas in later years the
limits had become effective in more cases. Also, the years 1952-55
were less prosperous than those which followed 1956 when a heavy
investment spurt started.
Another point to be noted in Table 13 is that, except during the
recession years 1952, 1954, and 1958, corporate saving was substan-
tially in excess of direct taxes on corporations. In an international
comparison of the levels of corporate saving and direct taxes on cor-Japan 73
porations (shown in Table 14), it may be observed that the level of
corporate saving relative to GNP is highest in Japan, and that only
in Japan, the Netherlands, and Australia does corporate saving ex-
ceed direct taxes on corporations. The difference between Japan
and the United States is striking; the level of direct taxes on corpo-
rations relative to GDP is much higher in the United States than in
Japan, while the rate of corporate saving is twice as high in Japan
as it is in the United States. This may seem somewhat puzzling, since
both the profit rate38 and the effective corporate income tax rate are
about the same in the two
This is primarily due to a high propensity to save by Japanese
corporations. Table 15 provides an international comparison of cor-
poration saving ratios. Since this table is based upon national in-
come statistics, intercorporation dividend payments are excluded
from corporate income and, in the case of Japan, increases in tax-
free reserves and accelerated depreciation allowances are included
in corporate income. However, even when adjustments are made for
these factors, the proportion of dividend payments in corporate dis-
The rate of net profit (after tax) on owned capital is only slightly higher,
and the rate of operating income to total assets is lower, in Japan than in the
United States. The following table is based upon financial statements of cor-
porations, so that the profit rate in Japan might be underrepresented to the
extent that tax-free reserves and accelerated depreciation allowances are more
imporant in Japan than the corresponding items, if any, in the U.S.
Profit Rate of
Profit Rate of All Largest Manufacturing
Manufacturing Corporations Corporationsa
(per cent) (per cent)
Japan U. S. Japan U. S.
(1955—60) (1958—61) (1955—60) (1958—61)
Ratio of net profit aftertax
to owned capital 11 .8 9 .1 11 .3 11 .1
Ratio of operating income
to total assets 9.7 10.6 9.8 10.5
Ratio of net profit after tax
tosales 2.6 4.4 5.8 8.2
Source: Computed from Ministry of Finance, Annual Report of Corporation Statistics,
for Japan, and from SEC-FTC, quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corpora-
tions, for U. S.
aCorporationswith capital stock more than 100 million yen for Japan; ones with
total assets more than 1 billion dollars for U. S.
InJapan, the effective tax rate on corporate profit, including local tax, is
approximately 50 per cent.74 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 14
International Comparison of Ratios of Corporate Saving and Direct





































SOURCE: U.N., Tearbook of National Accounts Statistics.
*1954—60.
b Including inventory valuation adjustment.
• 1951—60.
posable income seems definitely lower in Japan than in the United
States.4°
The high propensity to save of Japanese corporations is due to
several factors. First, in Japan the need to accumulate internal
funds is more urgent in view of rapidly expanding investment op-
portunities. Second, the separation of management and ownership
is more pronounced in Japan than in the United States, thus giving
management relatively more freedom in the disposition of profits.
Third, Japanese corporations can hold down the ratio of dividends
to corporate profits because new shares are issued at face value; the
shareholders are given the difference between the market and face
40The average ratio of saving to disposable income of all corporations (ex-
cluding corporations in finance and insuTance) in Japan, computed from Minis-
try of Finance, Annual Report of Corporation Statistics, is 47.4 per cent (av-
erage for 1955-60). The corresponding figure for the United States, computed
from the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, is 27.6 per cent (an
average for 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1958).Japan 75
TABLE15
International Comparison of the Ratio of Corporate Saving to
Corporate Income After Tax, 1950—59
(per cent)
Norway 88.3 New Zealand 52.1
Japan 78.4 Canada 51.1
Finland 73.9 Australia •49.1
Germany,Fed.Rep. 68.1 France 47.9
United Kingdom 54.6 United States 44.0
SOURCE: U.N.: World Economic Survey, 1 960, and Yearbook of National Accounts
Stalislics. Corporate income after tax was computed from national income statistics.
values as capital gains, so that dividends represent only a small part
of their earnings. This practice gives rise to very difficult statistical
and conceptual problems when making an international compari-
son.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SPECIAL TAX PROVISIONS FOR
TAX-FREE RESERVES ON CORPORATE SAVINGS
Table 13 shows that increases in accumulated tax-free reserves
represent a substantial part of corporate saving in postwar Japan.
This does not necessarily mean that the special provisions permit-
ting tax-free reserves really increased the supply of internal funds of
corporations to that extent. Two effects of these provisions may be
separately considered for the purpose of our analysis: a general or
over-all effect on the saving of a "representative" corporation, and
differential effects on the saving of various industries or corpora-
tions. To analyze the general effect, let us consider two situations.
Case 1. We assume first that the provisions allowing tax-free re-
serves are abolished and that there is no change in the corporate in-
come tax rates. In this case, the total corporate income tax that a
"representative" corporation has to pay will increase, a part of the
increase in tax will be shifted to the general public, and the sales of
corporations will decline somewhat relative to the sales of unincor-
porated firms. Only in an extreme case will all of the increase in the
tax be shifted without effecting corporate profits. Thus it is clear
that the incidence of• corporate income tax is one of the key factors76 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
here; it is also one of the problem areas in economics about which
very little is known. Another key factor is corporate dividend pol-
icy. The effect of the abolition of the special provisions depends on
whether corporations try to maintain the same dividend rate as be-
fore or whether they reduce dividends in order to maintain the
same level of corporate saving. But we also know very little about
corporate dividend policy. While it is likely that corporate saving
(including tax-free reserves) would decrease, the amount of the de-
crease would probably be considerably less than the previous
amount of transfers to hitherto tax-free reserves. The total supply
of national saving will be more likely to increase than decrease if
the marginal propensity of the government to save is very high and
that of the shareholders moderately high.
Case 2. We assume that the provisions for tax-free reserves are
abolished and the corporate income tax rate is reduced so as to
leave the total corporate income tax payments unchanged. In this
case there would be no change in the tax burden of our "representa-
tive" corporation and, if corporations paid the same rate of dividend
as before, there would be no change in the level of corporate saving.
In other words, if corporate dividend policy is such that dividends
represent a certain given proportion of real corporate profit includ-
ing transfers to tax-free reserves, corporations would have reduced
corporate saving out of after-tax income to the extent that they
made transfers to tax-free reserves when the provisions allowing such
reserves were introduced. On the other hand, if corporations pay
as dividends a certain given proportion of their after-tax incomes
including such transfers, they will in this case increase dividend pay-
ments and reduce corporate saving.
We do not know enough about the determinants of corporate
dividend policy to be able to say which of these rules is more likely
to be adopted; for example, why the dividend ratio (approximately
equal to unity minus the saving ratio given in Table 15) is so
different from country to country. What is certain is only that cor-
porations are induced by a tax-free reserve provision to save in this
form rather than in the form of retained profit out of their after-tax
income.4'
Incidentally, in Table 13 it is observed that between 1952 and 1955, when theJapan 77
Theintention of the government in introducing the special tax
provisionsfor tax-free reserves is not quite clear. If the purpose of
the provisions was to increase the total supply of national saving,
they do not seem to have been very effective. If it was to lighten the
tax burden of corporations, a general reduction in the tax rate
would have been a more equitable solution. If it was to increase the
proportion of owned capital and reduce that of borrowed funds in
corporate financing, the provisions might have been effective, but
again there were much better ways of accomplishing this.42
Let us now turn to the differential effects of the special tax provi-
sions on tax-free reserves. Table 16 is based upon an unpublished
survey by the Ministry of Finance of leading corporations with cap-
ital stock of more than 100 million yen. The total number of corpo-
rations covered was 1,312 in the 1959 survey and 501 in 1961. These
corporations account for a large percentage of the total corporate
income tax revenue: 54.1 per cent and 40.3 per cent respectively for
the 1959 and 1961 surveys. Nonfinancial corporations in the survey
accounted for 69.2 per cent in 1959 and 46.8 per cent in 1960 of the
total owned capital of all nonfinancial corporations.
Table 16 gives the ratios of tax-free reserve balances to owned
capital in selected industries. Undoubtedly the banking industry is
the one which benefits most from the provision for bad debt re-
serves, and the insurance industry (also included among financial
corporations in Table 16) from the provision for abnormal-risk re-
serves. The electricity industry gains most frorn the provision for
water-shortage reserves, and marine transportation and iron and steel
benefit most from the provision for special repair reserves. However,
provisions were lenient and the accumulation of the reserves was rapid, the
level of corporate saving (including increases in reserves) waslowerthan in
other years, and that the level of total corporate saving went up rather than
declined relative to GDP from the early 1950's to later years when the importance
of tax-free reserves declined. If other things were equal in these years, this may
be taken as an evidence of the failure of the provisions to promote the supply
of corporate saving, but "other things" could not be equal.
For example, the government might have lowered the tax rate on retained
profits, to avoid double income taxation at corporate and personal levels, and
have abolished separate taxation of interest income under personal income tax
laws. As mentioned in section II, separate taxation of interest income makes
deposits with commercial banks and other financial institutions more attractive,
and makes it possible for these financial intermediaries to attract a much larger
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it should be remembered that rates of interest, insurance premiums
and power rates are subject to close government regulation.
The provision for retirement allowance reserves gives an advan-
tage to labor-intensive industries such as mining or construction,
but the advantage disappears when payments from the reserve ex-
ceedtransfers to it, as has been the case in mining in recent years.
A ccelera ted Depreciation Allowances
Since 1951, a number of special provisions for accelerated depre-
ciation allowances have been introduced into the Japanese tax
system.48 Major ones are as follows: (1) Machinery for moderniza-
tion (since 1952); (2) "Important" machinery (3) Ma-
chinery and equipment for research and development (since 1952);
(4) Machinery and equipment for industrial utilization of new tech-
nologies (since 1958); (5) Mining and prospecting machinery, equip-
ment and driftways (since 1954); (6) Machinery for modernization
of cooperatives (1953-61, see note 44); (7) Machinery for moderniza-
tion of small business (since 1963); (8) Industrial machinery in un-
derdeveloped or coal-mining areas (since 1961); (9) Cost of afforesta-
tion (since 1957); (10) Newly built houses for rent (since 1952).
Since 1950, the Japanese government has tried to raise the ordi-
nary rate of depreciation: first, by allowing corporations and pro-
prietors three times (1950-54) to revalue their fixed assets in view of
the war and postwar inflation, and second by twice revising the list
of useful lives for each type of fixed asset (in 1951 and in 1962).
The Ministry of Finance in an unpublished study of the results of
the revision of useful lives in 1962, found that the present ordinary
rate of depreciation given in the Japanese tax law is in most cases a
little higher than the American rate after the 1962 revision, or the
British rate after the 1963 revision. Also, the ratio of total deprecia-
tion allowances to the value of fixed assets is higher in Japan than
in the United States or Britain in most
All of these provisions (except item 10) are applicable both to individual
and corporate income taxes, but the amounts relevant to personal income tax
are neglible. The literal translation of the original Japanese words is "special"
rather than "accelerated" depreciation, but I use accelerated depreciation since
it is more familiar in English.
Partly abolished and partly absorbed into (1), in 1961.
However, the German rate is still definitely higher than the Japanese oneJapan 81
Therefore, it is clear that the provisions for accelerated deprecia-
tion listed above are not an attempt to adjust unduly low ordinary
depreciation rates, but are intended to promote investment in par-
ticular industries by giving them extraordinary privileges.
The provisions relating to these accelerated depreciation allow-
ances constitute one of the most complicated parts of the Japanese
tax system; only a brief outline of them will be given here.
ThE PURPOSE
The purpose of provisions 1, 2, 6, and 7 is modernization of in-
dustrial facilities. Quantitatively, these four groups, and particular.
ly provisions 1 and 2, are overwhelmingly important (see Table 11).
Advancement of new technologies is the purpose of provisions 3
and 4, and provisions 5 and 9 are designed to promote better utili-
zation of domestic natural resources. The purpose of provision 8 is
to promote industrialization of underdeveloped or depressed coal-
mining areas and that of provision 10 is to alleviate the shortage of
houses in big cities.
ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION RATE
The rate at which the assets may be depreciated varies from one
provision to another. The typical rate before and after the revision
in 1961 under each provision is as follows:
Provisions1958-60 1961-63
1. One-half of the cost of acquisi-One-third of the cost of acquisition
tion in the first year. in the first year.
2. 150 per cent of the usual depre-Abolished (partly absorbed in provi-
ciation allowances in thefirstsion 1) in 1961.
three years.
3. 50, 20, and 20 per cent respec-One-third of the cost of acquisition
tively of the cost of acquisitionin the first year.
in the first three years.
in most cases. There are still complaints from some industries that the useful
lives given in the tax law are too long, since machines are used for longer
hours every day (with two shifts or even three shifts) in Japan than in other
countries. In boom years a few big corporations in such industries as automo-
biles and electrical machinery actually depreciate their assets at faster rates
than the ordinary and accelerated rates prescribed in the tax law. In such a
case the announced profit of the corporation becomes substantially less than the
profit for tax purposes.- ---_ —
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4. Same as provision 1. Same as provision I.
5. 90 to 100 per cent of the cost inSame as in 1958.
the first year.
6. 150 per cent of the usual depre-Abolished (partly absorbed in provi-
ciation allowances in the firstsion 1) in 1961.
three years.
7. Not yet introduced. 133 per cent of the usual deprecia-
tion allowances in the first five years
(introduced in 1963).
8. Not yet introduced. One-third of the cost of acquisition
in the first year (introduced in 1961).
9. 20 per cent each of the cost ofSame as in 1958.
acquisition in the first five years.
10. 200 per cent of the usual depre-Same as in 1958.
ciation allowances in the first
five years.
The rate of depreciation was generally reduced and made more uni-
form by the extensive 1960 revision of the provisions for accelerated
depreciation.
Most of these provisions are very selective in their application. In
many, there is a clause "in industries designated by the Minister of
Finance," or "types of machinery or equipment specified by the
Minister of Finance," or both. The list of industries, the detailed
specifications of each type of machinery and equipment, and the
relevant time period, for which provisions 1 and 2 apply runs about
150 pages and is longer than the list of the useful lives for ordinary
depreciation. According to the Report of the Commission for Tax
Policy Investigation, published in 1960,
the present system of accelerated depreciation is ... extremelycomplicated.
Particularly under provisions 1 and 2 the types of machinery and equip-
ment eligible for accelerated depreciation are so minutely classified that
no less than 500 types under (1) and 1,300 under (2) are distinguished.
Moreover, the provisions prescribe such meticulous details in specifica-
tions that only a very experienced specialist could tell whether or not a
certain machine is eligible for accelerated depreciation.46
It may be mentioned also that the selective nature of the system
necessitates very complicated administrative procedures. The report
quoted above also says, "... formalitiesto apply for these compli-
Report by the Commission, Dec. 1960, p. 313.Ja pan 83
cated accelerated depreciation allowances are very cumbersome for
small
THE EFFECTS OF ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION ON THE
AGGREGATE LEVEL OF CAPITAL FORMATION
The effect of the provisions for accelerated depreciation on the
aggregate level of capital formation is to be distinguished from their
differential effects on various industries or various groups of corpo-
rations. My tentative position is that acceleration depreciation does
not seem to have much effect on the level of total investment in a
country like Japan, where the investment demand continues to be
very brisk, and excess demand for investment funds persists.
Accelerated depreciation is essentially the same as a loan at zero
interest rate made by the government to the firm involved, and as
such stimulates investment in several ways. This stimulus seems to
be particularly great in Japan for three reasons. First, the rate of
interestis much higherin Japan thaninother advanced
countries.48 This fact makes a loan at zero interest rate particularly
attra.ctive to Japanese investors. Second, the rate of growth of most
firms is much higher, so that accelerated depreciation lowers the
effective tax rate more substantially in Japan than in other coun-
tries. According to opinions of industry representatives and tax offi-
cials, accelerated depreciation gives a very strong incentive where it
applies. Corporations try to "save" corporate income tax by making
heavy investment in those types of machinery on which accelerated
depreciation is allowed, and particularly in those for which the des-
ignated time period expires in the near future.
Third, corporations depend on bank loans more heavily in Japan
than in other countries as a source of their investment funds in
plant and equipment (see Table 17). Japanese bankers say that they
are more willing to make loans .on investment for which accelerated
depreciation applies, since they can recover the loans within a
shorter period and with more certainty. Therefore, there is no
doubt that accelerated depreciationisparticularly effective in
Japan in stimulating incentives to invest in fixed assets on which
Ibid.
See footnote 11.84 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 17
Percentage Distribution of Sources of Funds for New Investment in












Loans of governmental financial institutions 5.9 4. 1
Special accounts for financial purposes 2.1 0.0





Retained profits 22.0 14.0
Subtotal 60.4 67.7
SOURCE: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics of Japan, and Ministry of Finance,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics on Public Finance and Money, No. 140, June 1963.
such rapid write-offs are permitted. However, this does not necessar-
ily lead to the conclusion that accelerated depreciation has raised
the aggregate level of capital formation in Japan.
When the level of annual plant and equipment investment of all
corporations rose by more than seven times within six years, or
from 556.6 billion yen in 1955 to 8,607.9 billion yen in 1961, a sub-
stantial part of the funds necessary for corporate investment came
from commercial banks and long-term credit banks (see Table 17).
Also, as there is practically no open market for bonds in postwar
Japan, bond financing is virtually not much different from a joint
loan from the banks which have consented to buy the bonds at the
time of flotation.49 Commercial banks and long-term credit banks
Commercial banks used these bonds as a security for advances from the
Bank of Japan. Other financial institutions or the general public rarely buyJapan 85
in turn depend on Bank of Japan advances5° for their sources of
funds and, through this channel, cash money necessary for economic
growth is supplied to the economy.
Two circumstances significantly differentiate the United States
from Japan in this connection. First, in Japan, even large corpora-
tions depend heavily on bank loans for financing their investment
in plant and equipment, so that commercial banks operating with
funds borrowed from the central bank play a key role in allocating
investment funds. Second, both lenders and borrowers in Japan are
not much concerned with the ratio of owned capital to total assets.
The average ratio of owned capital to total assets of all nonfinancial
corporations was 29.0 per cent (34.0 per cent for manufacturing)
in 1955, about half the prewar level. The ratio declined further
through the years of a heavy investment upsurge to 22.3 per cent
(27.3 per cent for manufacturing) in 1961.
During this period, part of the funds for private plant and equip-
ment investment came from the government and government
banks. Particularly, the Japan Development Bank played a strategic
rol.e in allocating funds to industries favored by the government.
The J.D.B. can persuade private banks to join in extending loans
to certain industries. In addition, the credit standing of corpora-
tions which are able to borrow from the J.D.B. is often raised. The
funds of government banks and the government's special accounts
come partly from postal savings, post office life insurance and postal
pension funds, and partly from ordinary government revenue.
The aggregate amount of funds made available for private invest-
merit is therefore determined primarily by three factors: the levels
of personal saving, the government's saving-investment balance, and
the Bank of Japan advances to commercial banks. The Bank of
Japan can increaseits advances so long asit does not incur
inflationary pressures or balance of payments difficulties. In other
words, the Bank of Japan adjusts the money supply so as to keep
bonds, since the rate of interest is kept too low in comparison with other finan-
cial The situation has changed only slightly since 1961,whena new
type of investment trust was started. The funds of these trusts are invested ex-
clusively in bonds.
Theinterest rate on Bank of Japan advances is normally lower than the
rate at which commercial banks lend, leaving a margin to be earned by com-
mercial banks.86 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
the total effective demand at a desired level. In European countries
such a level of effective demand would correspond to the condition
of full employment, but in Japan it is determined by industrial
capacity and by the balance of payments situation.
So long as investment is not entirely inelastic with respect to the
interest rate, the monetary authorities can adjust the level of effec-
tive demand (a "liquidity trap" is unlikely to occur in postwar
Japan). When the Bank of Japan behaves in this way, under certain
simplifying assumptions, an upward shift in the investment sched-
ule caused by the introduction of special depreciation will not raise
the aggregate level of investment, but will result in a rise in the
rate of interest.51 In such a case, the aggregate level of capital for-
mation is determined by the supply of saving at the desired level of
national income, and not by the position of the investment sched-
ule. It is clear then that, in a country like Japan, special deprecia-
tion could contribute to a higher rate of capital formation only in
the following cases.
1. If effective demand is below the level of national income
which the monetary and fiscal authorities think desirable, an up-
ward shift in the investment schedule will increase investment. In
postwar Japan, however, except possibly for a short period in
1955-56, there has always been an excess demand for investment
funds, and, despite high rates of interest, the monetary authori-
ties have had to restrict the money supply by various measures very
close to direct controls. Moreover, if effective demand is short of the
desired level, the monetary authorities can increase investment by
increasing the money supply and thereby lowering the rate of inter-
est. It may be argued that such a policy would not be effective if in-
vestment is inelastic with respect to the rate of interest. However, if
that is the case, accelerated depreciation, being a loan at zero inter-
est rate, would not be effective either.
2. If personal saving is elastic with. respect to the rate of interest,
a rise in the interest rate will increase the total supply of saving and
therefore the rate of investment. But this possibility seems remote.
3. If the total gross saving of the government and corporations
In other words, when the government lends money to private firms in the
form of special depreciation, the amount that the Bank of Japan and govern-
inent banks can safely lend without incurring inflationary pressures or balance
of payments difficulties is reduced.'-I -
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taken together is increased by accelerated depreciation, an increase
in investment would follow. To examine this, consider a situation
in which the provisions for accelerated depreciation are all abol-
ished. Whether the total saving of the government and corporations
would be reduced or not depends on the government's marginal pro-
pensity to save and the dividend policy of corporations. Again the
possibility seems remote.
Our tentative conclusion is, then, that accelerated depreciation
does not seem to have affected the aggregate level of capital forma-
tion much, and if it has, the same result could have been achieved
by a more expansionary monetary policy.
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION
As explained earlier, accelerated depreciation stimulates incen-
tives to invest more strongly in Japan than in other countries.
Therefore, it is beyond doubt that the provisions for accelerated
depreciation have had important effects on the allocation of re-
sources among industries, among fields of activity, between big and
small business, and so on.
Selective or discriminatory treatment of various industries in the
special tax provisions for accelerated depreciation are an integral
part of postwar Japanese economic policy. The government has
tried to favor certain industries, certain types of economic activity,
or certain groups of firms through such measures as the import li-
cense system, allocation of investment funds, licensing of foreign
patent and technological know-how contracts, and special tax pro-
visions. The announced policy objectives are to accelerate "modern-
ization" of industry, technological progress, structural change to-
ward higher stages of economic development, and to improve the
balance of payments. The government policies seem to have favored
the following groups of industries.
1. The so-called "heavy and chemical industries." The possibility
of technological progress and expansion of export demand in the
near future is considered to be greater in the "heavy and chemical
industries" than in others.
2. Export industries and import-competing industries which im-
prove the balance of payments.
8. Industries which supply important basic materials, energy, or88 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
basic productive services: namely, iron and steel, electric power,
coal, marine transportation, and chemical fertilizers. However, the
emphasis on these industries was greater in the early postwar years
and has been gradually diminishing.
Furthermore, from time to time, capital or producers' goods in-
dustries have received preferential treatment over consumers' goods
industries, modern industries over traditional or small business sec-
tors, and heavy over light industries. Moreover, politically influential-
declining industries, such as agriculture, coal mining, or marine
transportation, have succeeded in securing some privileges from the
government, very often because of the argument that they make im-
portant contributions to a favorable balance of payments.52
Detailed examination of various statistical sources has revealed
that the industries most favored under accelerated depreciation
visions during 1955-61 were iron and steel, bearings, automobiles,
industrial machinery, shipbuilding, and synthetic fibers. In addition,
from time to time, industries such as paper and pulp, petroleum
electrical wires, nonferrous metals, and food processing also
seem to have benefited considerably from accelerated depreciation.
With so many different industries granted special privileges, one
wonders about the objectives of government policy for industry.
It is difficult to appraise the differential effects of accelerated de-
preciation on economic growth. Since the selective tax policy in re-
gard to accelerated depreciation constitutes a part of the whole system
of government intervention in industry, it must be evaluated to-
gether with other policy measures. For example, tax exemption for
water shortage reserves is in a sense partial compensation for low
electric power rates. A high rate of accelerated depreciation for iron
and steel represents only a small part of the government's protection-
ist policy toward this industry. An increase in the accelerated de-
preciation for transportation equipment in recent years is a reflection
of the government's effort to prepare for the coming import-liberal-
ization of automobiles.
Although the government's policy toward industry is intended to
Since there are so many ways to rationalize the preferential treatment of
an industry, the government's policy measures are not infrequently contradictory.
It is quite probable, therefore, that the effects of some measures cancel out the
effects of others.Ja pan 89
promote economic growth and/or to improve the balance of pay-
ments, there are cases in which its effects are of doubtful benefit.
For example, coal mining and marine transportation were among
four or five industries granted top priorities in the early postwar
period, but later it became apparent that too much of the country's
resources were being drawn into these industries. In the field of tax
policy, a notable example of misdirected intervention is the short-
lived (1955-58) provision for special depreciation of the cost of re-
modeling coal-burning boilers into fuel-oil-burning ones. In 1955
this provision was introduced in order to reduce the cost of energy,
but was hastily abolished in 1958 in view of the rapidly rising un-
employment of coal miners. Since then, the government has been
trying to increase the demand for coal by various measures.
Another controversial case is the generous special depreciation
granted the iron and steel industry. This may have been a cause of
overinvestment in that industry in 1959-60. Since the end of 1961,
there has been substantial excess capacity in iron and steel, and a
strict cartel to curtail production and investment, in which the gov-
ernment has participated, has been in effect. It is conceivable that
in other cases as well some discriminatory special tax provisions
may have misdirected rather than improved resource allocation.
These considerations suggest that whether special depreciation
has contributed to economic growth through its differential impacts
on individual industries is a question which is almost impossible to
answer. Up to now there has been no attempt to examine such a
problem empirically, and it would be extremely difficult to do so.
CONCLUDING WORDS
In spite of the great emphasis laid in postwar Japan upon the
promotion of capital formation and economic growth as policy ob-
jectives of the tax system, very little is known empirically about the
contribution of various tax measures to such ends. The effect of a
particular tax measure in promoting capital formation or economic
growth seems at best to be very limited, and the slight desirable
effect on growth has often been bought at substantial cost. For ex-
ample, discriminatory tax provisions are accompanied by rather ob-90 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
vious undesirable effects, such as distributive inequity, complication
of tax administration, and discouragement of cooperation by tax-
not to speak of the dubious relations between pressure
groups and Congressmen or bureaucrats.
Often there would seem to be better ways of producing the same
result. For example, to promote personal saving it might well have
been as effective and would have been more equitable, to moderate
the progressiveness of the rate structure of the income tax rather
than to introduce preferential treatment of property incomes. Or,
government saving through a surplus budget rather than through
private saving might have been used to finance investment. To pro-
mote plant and equipment investment, either a more expansionary
monetary policy or an over-all shortening of the period defining
useful lives of fixed assets would have probably been better than
discriminatory special depreciation.
COMMENT
SUMIO HARA, BANK OF TOKYO
My remarks will be divided into three parts. First, I will give my
over-all opinion on the main sections of Ryutaro Komiya's report.
Point-by-point discussions of it will, I hope, be made by Makoto
Yasui.
In general I agree with Komiya's arguments in Section II on per-
sonal savings and the tax system. Indeed, whenever an important
request to alleviate the tax on property income, interest, or divi-
dends was considered, it was the people of the Tax Bureau, includ-
ing myself, whopointed out the high cost of inequity as opposed to
the precarious effect on accelerating personal savings. I feel that,
besides inequity, the tax evasion aspect is very significant, for, if tax
evaders have a safe haven in which to hide their unreported in-
come, it is a significant deterrent to full compliance by good tax-
payers.
As to the special tax provisions on tax-free reserves, those provi-
These adverse effects are emphasized by Sei Fujita, "Tax Policy" in Eco'
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sions were introduced not only for the three purposes mentioned by
Komiya—to increase total supply of national saving, to lighten the
tax burden of corporations, and to increase the proportion of
owned capital—but also to comply with the principles of business
accounting that a taxpayer's credit and his inventory assets have to
be partly counterbalanced by some reserve fund corresponding to
their inherent and possible depreciation, and that a taxpayer's lia-
bility to pay his employees allowances when they are retired must
be measured and debited against his assets. As for the effectiveness
of these special tax provisions in meeting these four purposes, I feel
that all of these purposes have been largely accomplished anyway.
As to the accelerated depreciation allowance, I feel that Komiya
is again too pessimistic. I think that the accelerated depreciation
has contributed to increasing corporate saving and, in turn, to in-
creasing total capital fonnation As for the differential effect of ac-
celerated depreciation, the differentiation was not only among
different kinds of industries, but it was inclined to favor modern,
ultramodern, or mammoth-size equipment. This answers Komiya's
questions about why such industries as paper and pulp, foods, and
textiles were given preference. The differentiation must have been
fairly effective in bringing about the conspicuous modernizing of
Japanese industrial equipment.
In the second part of my discussion, I would like to give the his-
torical background of how and why such generous and divergent
special tax provisions were adopted. What we call special tax provi-
sions are provisions intended to provide incentives for certain pol-
icy purposes, which are more numerous than those discussed by Ko-
miya. They include: (1) accelerating savings; (2) increasing the re-
tained earning reserves of individual or corporate businesses; (3)
technological innovation and modernization of equipment; (4) di-
vergent kinds of industrial incentives, such as export-import credit,
exemption from tax on the income from new important products,
exemption of custom duties on the import of essential machines;
and (5) other miscellaneous purposes, including the allowance for
income from rice sold to the government and a special percentage
allowance in computing income from medical treatment under so-
cial security insurance.
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upon the recommendation of the Shoup tax mission, the whole sys-
tem was logically rearranged and correlated. And most of the spe.
cial tax provisions then in force were abolished. However, as Japan
has followed "the tax cut policy" persistently ever since, the cuts
could not be confined to general and over-all alleviation, and a
number of special tax provisions were introduced in 1952 and 1953.
This was partly due to the fact that in those years a general tax cut,
which naturally required a change in law, was considered more
difficult to accomplish than changes in government ordinances,
which were largely entrusted to the administration. Various tax-free
reserves could be provided by such ordinances. On the other hand, I
feel that the fact that the Japanese government became more sensi-
tive to its economic policy after the termination of the occupation in
April 1952 was another reason for such new special tax provisions.
Besides, judging from our experience, the pressure for special tax
provisions is generally much stronger than that for the general tax
alleviation.
Then, in 1957, the tide was somewhat A general tax cut
was given top priority and the increase in revenue resulting from
the repeal or curtailment of special tax provisions was appropriated
to offset a part of the loss of revenue due to the general cut. Since
then, the principle of narrowing the scope of special tax provisions
has with time come to be established, and now this principle is ac-
cepted as a part of the government's avowed tax policy, although it
maintains the attitude that new special tax provisions will still be
required from time to time.
I have given this historical background at some length because I
feel that tax policy for economic growth should be studied not only
from a theoretical point of view, but also from sociopolitical and
practical standpoints. As has been pointed out here, tax policy has
not been determined solely by theoretical growth considerations.
Moreover, whenever some growth point of view is taken up, pres-
sure groups are very apt to wield such strong influences as to distort
the whole picture. So I hope that this kind of international coop-
eration in the formulation of tax policy will be particularly out-
spoken on this point and asfaraspossible provide counter
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In our case, we felt that the balance between equity and economic
policy had to be very carefully maintained all through the processes
of tax law changes. For this reason, we endeavored to have as many
of these changes as possible discussed openly before the people. The
devices for this were manifold. Every year the government set up a
Tax System Research Commission which somehow came to be the
arena for such open discussions. The press, magazines, and other
communications media took a keen interest in tax changes. Of
course, the debates in the Diet Committee were also very valuable
for this purpose.
In the third and last part of my discussion, I want to point out
that the Japanese tax system has a very strong built-in stabilizing
effect, although this power has never been actually allowed to play
its part because of the extraordinary elasticity of credit supply in
our monetary system. The built-in stabilizing effect of our tax sys-
tem is well demonstrated by the fact that tax revenues have been so
susceptible to economic vicissitudes as to show an elasticity in rela-
tion to GNP of over two during boom years compared with well
below one during slumps. So, if this stabilizing effect had been kept
intact, the trend of the Japanese economy would have been much
smoother than it actually was. However, the Japanese monetary
supply was somehow too elastic. When the economy was booming,
banks were not very reluctant to satisfy the demand for more credit
from business. And their monetary sources were, after all, replen-
ished by the Central Bank to the extent that the deflationary effect
through higher tax revenue was not only offset but sometimes even
more than offset. As a result, Japanese economic growth has become
very spasmodic since the overheated economy has to be cooled down
by rather sudden contractions of credit. This somewhat extraordi-
nary elasticity of credit supply by banks was probably one of the
most powerful causes of the spectacular growth of the Japanese
economy, although whether the resultant spasmodic nature of the
growth gave us a higher rate of growth in the long run than would
otherwise have prevailed needs further study.
In closing, if a frank observation may be permitted, I would like
to say that this latent stabilizing effect reflects the greater com-
pliance of our taxpayers as well as the increased efficiency of the taxr
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administration. I say this because the correspondence between the
increment of the unexpected economic growth and that of the tax
revenue can be numerically traced fairly closely.
MAKOTO YASUI, MINISTRY OF FINANCE
I will begin my discussion of Komiya's report by acknowledging the
help of the staff of the Tax Bureau. However, the opinions ex-
pressed here are my private ones and do not necessarily represent
the opinions of the Japanese government.
I would like to comment on three points, personal saving, tax-
free reserves, and accelerated depreciation.
In general I agree with Komiya's .opinions on personal savings,
but I should like to discuss briefly his remarks on the relative
weights of personal income tax and indirect taxes. Japan's tax cut
policy has mainly stressed reduction of personal income tax. During
the past fourteen years, the total amount of tax reduction has ex-
ceeded 1 trillion yen. Personal income tax reductions account for 84
per cent, of which 64 per cent is attributable to increases in person-
al exemptions. In actual prices, the personal exemption is now al-
most six times as high as it was in 1950. In real prices, it is about
four times as high.
According to the Family Income and Expenditure Survey in
Japan, low income groups below the minimum taxable income
begin to do some saving. Steady increases in the personal exemption
as a way of implementing the tax cut policy has resulted in increas-
ing the total amount of saving by permitting low income families to
save.
As for this tax cut policy, I should like to point out the fact that
the percentage of tax reduction achieved by changing the tax
was not high. The largest amount of tax reduction was in the 1957
tax reform, but at the same time two revenue-increasing measures
were taken. That is, a new high rate was added by changing the
maximum rate from 65 to 70 per cent and by making the new rate
applicable to a new and higher bracket of income. Also the rate of
dividend credit was cut down from 30 to 20 per cent. In recent tax
reforms, reductions of tax rates have been both small in size and—. -
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havebeen limited to the low brackets. Also, the rapid increase of
income in recent years has made the income tax structure more pro-
gressive. I admit, though, that it is not clear what criteria should be
used to judge progressivity.
In discussing tax-free reserves, Komiya stated that the intention
of the government in introducing the special tax provisions on tax-
free reserves was not quite clear. As Hara already pointed out, these
reserves were introduced mainly to implement certain accounting
principles. I would like to discuss this point further. First, consider
the reserve for bad debts. Here it should be noted that the Japanese
tax laws have two special characteristics. First, the criterion of what
constitutes bad debts that may be deducted from income is very se-
vere. For example, the bankruptcy of a debtor is not sufficient; the
debt must also be proved uncollectible. Secondly, valuation losses
on credit are not allowed in the Japanese tax laws. So, from an ac-
counting viewpoint, the reserve for bad debts is recognized as a
kind of valuation reserve.
Next, take the reserve for inventory price fluctuations. Some ac-
counting scholars defend it as a way of equalizing the profit which
is necessary for business, as a reserve for contingencies, or even as a
kind of valuation reserve. But generally this reserve is considered by
tax experts as a kind of retained profit.
Last is the reserve for employee retirement allowances, which is
generally regarded as a liability reserve. For example, Komiya states
that the maximum limit on the balance is half the assumed total
retirement allowance. According to the estimate by the Tax Bu-
reau, the present value of future retirement allowances is 50.8 per
cent, if it is recalculated on the basis of an annual interest rate of 8
per cent.
I admit that these reserves contribute to corporate savings, and
the extent of the contribution does, in fact, differ among industries.
So it may be necessary to revise the method of allowing these re-
serves, and possibly to change the percentages. However, in my
opinion the necessity of allowing some reserves cannot be denied
completely, especially for bad debts and employee retirement allow-
ances. In other words, these reserves shOuld not be treated as special
tax provisions.
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the war and as a result the retained income of enterprises was large-
ly wiped out. Attention should be paid to this point in making in-
ternational comparisons of current corporate saving.
As for the accelerated depreciation allowance, my argument here
is chiefly concerned with the so-called "differential effects of acceler-
ated depreciation." Komiya has said that he is puzzled about the
principle governing government policy toward industry. Accelerat-
ed depreciation is applicable only to an enterprise that meets two
requirements. One is that the business of the enterprise must belong
to an important industry designated by the law on enterprise im-
provement promotion. The other is that the machinery or equip-
ment which the enterprise acquires must be designated as urgently
needed to modernize such an industry by a notification from the
Ministry of Finance.
Machinery or equipment thus designated is limited to the basic
components. Therefore, investment on such machinery and equip-
ment inevitably invites related investment. Some actual examples
from the first half of the 1962 accounting period are available. For
steel companies, the total amount of new investment was 6 billion
yen, of which the amount of the machinery and equipment eligible
for accelerated depreciation was 3 billion yen, or 50 per cent. For
companies manufacturing machinery, these figures were 4.3 billion
yen, 1.5 billion yen, and 34 per cent. For companies manufacturing
electrical machinery, they were 10.6 billion yen, 1.0 billion yen, and
10 per cent.
We can assume that the largest part of the new investment was
accelerated by the application of accelerated depreciation. Loss of
revenue by accelerated depreciation is limited to the interest on the
corporation tax because, over the useful lives of such machinery
and equipment, the bulk of the loss of revenue will be recovered.
Accelerated depreciation is, on the one hand, less inequitable than
other special tax provisions and, on the other hand, is effective in
the promotion of investment because it invites related investment.
My conclusion on this point is that the government may have com-
mitted some errors in designation, but nevertheless accelerated depre-
ciation has apparently contributed to the modernization of Japa-
nese industry.